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Abstract
We study how a buyer should structure his demand in the presence of disec-
onomies of scale in production. Compared to an e¢ cient market with n (identical)
suppliers, he benets from auctioning large blocks of contracts and sourcing only
the remainder via the market. Optimally, he sets n   2 or n   1 lots, depending
on his bargaining power vs. a single supplier. The distortion leads to overproduc-
tion and to the misallocation of production. When he has commitment power and
can strategically set the quantity, block sourcing is still benecial, but unless his
bargaining power is very high it leads to underproduction.
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1 Introduction
We consider a buyer of a divisible homogeneous input and upstream a nite number
of suppliers who have increasing marginal costs of production. The buyers default option
is to purchase his requirements from the suppliers via a competitive(reverse) auction,
where in equilibrium price equals marginal cost and production is e¢ cient. We ask the
question: Can he increase his surplus by block sourcing? We dene block sourcing as
grouping together part of the requirements into sole-sourced lots (blocks) and sourcing
the residual demand competitively. We nd that e¤ective lots must be larger than the
e¢ cient quantity of a single supplier, thus they can only benet the buyer if he manages
to squeeze the suppliersprot margin1 su¢ ciently to compensate for the deadweight loss
created. We show that when lots of the appropriate number and size are introduced,
suppliers indeed end up bidding averageprices for these that are su¢ ciently below their
marginal cost to benet the buyer.
Our model captures a host of situations, but our focal application is that of procure-
ment of a large company consisting of many sub-units, where block sourcing means the
centralization of some of its supply management. A typical example would be a Health
Board running a number of hospitals.2 We analyze the decision of the Board on how
to group the requirements of its hospitals into sole-sourced lots. That is, we consider
centralization3 as an enabler of partial coordination of procurement demands rather than
as a blunt instrument that agglomerates all requirements into a single contract what
1Indeed, since the competitive price is determined by marginal cost, which is increasing, the suppliers
do make positive prots in the e¢ cient Bertrand equilibrium.
2Alternatively, a tour operator looking for hotel rooms for its clients, or a produce wholesaler sourcing
from many growers, etc.
3Actual procurement policies are highly heterogeneous regarding their degree of centralization and
the structure of the supply contracts. As reported by Dimitri et al. (2006), while public sector tendency
is to use centralized systems, the private sector is more heterogenous in this respect: centralization and
decentralization coexist. Baldi and Vannoni (2014) provide some examples of such heterogeneity. During
the 1990s, many big companies went through important reorganization of their activities, including
purchasing, and adopted di¤erent combinations of centralized and decentralized procurement. Some of
them, as Motorola, General Electric, United Technologies and Fiat, decentralized this function, whereas
some others, such as Honda and General Motors, centralized it.
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would (especially) make sense if there were economies of scale in production.4 We show,
in this paper, that centralizing purchasing decisions continues to be an optimal policy
when there are diseconomies of scale.
Our insight is that the competitive pressure facing the suppliers is in part determined
by the lot policy chosen. How keen a supplier is to obtain a block contract depends on
her outside option. This outside option is actually an inside option in our model: it is
determined by what she can expect to supply in the residual market. The size and com-
petitiveness of this aftermarket5 are endogenous: the more demand is satised through
lots, the less residual demand there is; in parallel, the more suppliers price themselves out
of the aftermarket by signing lot contracts (thereby increasing their marginal costs), the
less competition there is in the aftermarket. By setting many large lots, the buyer can
squeeze the suppliersprot margins in the aftermarket. As this makes their inside option
worse, they also bid more aggressively for the block contracts, in the aggregate more than
compensating for the ine¢ ciency.6
Under the simplifying assumption of n identical suppliers, we show that the optimal
lot policy is always one of two options: either n   2 or n   1 lots of equal size. Which
of the two is better is a function of the buyers bargaining power when he faces a single
remaining supplier to satisfy his residual demand. If it is high, he can a¤ordto set the
less ine¢ cient n  1 lots, otherwise not. This means that with the unique exception of
the case of two suppliers and low buyer bargaining power it is always optimal to bundle
some (most) of the buyers requirements.
The optimal lot policy leads to a suboptimal distribution of production across sup-
pliers as the optimal lot size exceeds the quantity sold by a supplier in the aftermarket.
To exacerbate this ine¢ ciency, the aggregate volume of trade is excessive as well: there
is overproduction. This raises the question of what happens when the buyer can credibly
commit to limit his demand in the aftermarket. To keep a fair comparison, we simul-
taneously replace the e¢ cient market with classical monopsony as the default option.
4Indeed, the ability to receive quantity discounts is one of the most cited reasons in favor of central-
ization (see Munson, 2007).
5It is not necessary that the residual market clear after the lot auction, but it sounds intuitive.
6To highlight the forces at play, following this Introduction we will go through a simple example.
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Remarkably, setting lots (optimally) is still superior when the buyer can strategically dis-
tort his demand (and therefore also compared to the competitive benchmark). At the
same time while the optimal policy is still setting either n   2 or n   1 lots above the
competitive production size there is nearly always7 underproduction.
We complement our general results with more detailed comparative static exercises
for specic families of cost and utility functions. We display how the marginal bargaining
power (that determines the optimal number of lots), prices, and buyer prots vary with
changes in the parameters, providing further intuition for our results.
In previous studies on optimal multi-sourcing, the procurement policy of the strategic
buyer is restricted to either single sourcing or multi-sourcing for the entire demand. Few
of these studies consider diseconomies of scale. The two main exceptions are Anton and
Yao (1989) and Inderst (2008). In their model, the way the award is split is endogenous:
sellers submit bids for di¤erent possible splits of the whole requirement of the buyer. This
set-up, together with diseconomies of scale, leads to the annoying result that, when
there are two suppliers, any split can be supported as an equilibrium.8 However, there is
one, involving the e¢ cient split, where suppliers maximize their individual prots. This
is a clear candidate for collusive bidding. Compared to this focal equilibrium, the buyer
will prefer to auction o¤ a sole-sourcing contract. Inderst (2008) amends this result 
reinforcing the equilibrium selection by applying a renement rst proposed by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) by pointing out that, when there is more than one buyer, single
sourcing results if and only if the buyer controls a su¢ ciently large share of the market.
The intuition is that single sourcing would increase competition among suppliers only
when the alternative to winning is bad enough (that is, the residual demand is low).
Otherwise, because of convex costs, the losing supplier will be able to obtain a large share
7The exception is when the buyers bargaining power is su¢ ciently high so that he captures enough
of the residual surplus to compensate for the higher lot prices resulting form the higher supplier prot in
the aftermarket. In this case, the residual quantity sold is e¢ cient, but only conditional on the quantity
bought via lots, and therefore there is still overproduction (in fact, the optimal lot policy is the same as
without commitment).
8We avoid the multiplicity encountered when bidding is in o¤er curves, by sticking with the commonly
observed procedure of setting the lot sizes before the auction takes place.
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of the residual demand and therefore she will bid less aggressively for the sole-sourcing
contract. Note that the presence of competition makes single sourcing worse rather than
making split awards better for our buyer.
In the next section we work out an example that conveys the main intuition. In
Section 3 we present and justify our model. Section 4 contains some preliminary results.
In Section 5 we analyze the optimal lot policy of the buyer without commitment power.
In Section 6 we discuss the case where the buyer can commit to a demand function of his
choice. Both Sections 5 and 6 contain comparative statics exercises for a restricted family
of cost and utility functions. Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section 7.
We collect the proofs not presented in the main text in Appendix A, while Appendix B
contains justications for our equilibrium selection.
2 Setting the stage
Let us go through an example to display the intuition for why block sourcing may lead
to gains for the buyer. Consider a buyer with a concave utility function, U(:), wishing
to buy a commodity supplied by three identical sellers with convex cost functions, c(:).
We compare two cases here: the default option is turning to the competitive market; the
block sourcing option is auctioning o¤ a lot, z, before going to the competitive market
with the two remaining9 suppliers. In the rst case, he will buy quantity Qc at (unit)
price pc, where, by denition, demand given by marginal utility equals marginal cost:
U 0(Qc) = c0(Qc=3) = pc. In the latter case, let us rst determine the outcome of the
second stage. Here, the remaining suppliers produce q and expect a prot of p2q   c(q)
each, where residual demand equals marginal cost: U 0(z + 2q) = c0(q) = p2. Note two
things: rst, that the second period price and quantity depend (negatively) on z; second,
that, when z = q(z), the outcome will be exactly the same as in the default case: block
sourcing makes no di¤erence at all.
A key observation is that, in equilibrium, the winner of the lot cannot make strictly
higher prot than the losers (otherwise a loser could underbid her by " and obtain almost
9We only exclude the winner of the lot for simplicity. In our model this restriction is not imposed.
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the same prot).10 Crucially, this means that squeezing the losersprot also squeezes
the winners. Thus, reducing the demand available to the losers by increasing the lots
size reduces the prots of all suppliers. Of course, this e¤ect is countervailed by the
ine¢ ciencies introduced, but as we will see, a well-chosen lot size always benets the
buyer. By the above observation, the (worst case) consumer surplus under block sourcing
can be written as the total surplus minus 3 supplier prots:
 = U(z + 2q)  c(z)  2c(q)  3 [c0(q)q   c(q)] :
Di¤erentiating with respect to z, we have
U 0(z + 2q)  c0(z) + dq
dz
[2U 0(z + 2q)  2c0(q)  3c00(q)q] :
Evaluating the above derivative at z = q(z) = Qc=3, which is equivalent to directly going
to the market, and rearranging, we obtain
d
dz
= [U 0(Qc)  c0(Qc=3)]

1 + 2
dq
dz

  dq
dz
c00(Qc=3)Qc > 0:
As the rst term is zero, by denition, and the quantity sold in the second stage is
clearly decreasing in the lot set aside totally di¤erentiating the market clearing condition
U 0(z+2q) = c0(q) and substituting in we have dq
dz
= U
00(Qc)
c00(Qc=3) 2U 00(Qc) < 0 , this derivative is
positive, indicating that it is protable to separate out a block contract that is (somewhat)
larger than the competitive quantity.
We can better appreciate the e¤ects at play graphically.
Figure 1a depicts the lot auction, while Figure 1b the second stage. The second stage
determines p2 and also the second stage consumer surplus (CS), the red triangle in Figure
1b. The prots of each supplier are then the blue triangle in Figure 1a (which is half the
black triangle in Figure 1b). The CS from the lot auction total surplus minus supplier
prot is the black pentagon in Figure 1a.
Now, observe that the red triangle in Figure 1a is the same as the red triangle in Figure
1b, translated to the right by the distance z. Consequently, total CS is given by the sum
10In fact, the prots of the winner and the losers must be equal, but that is a bit harder to prove, and
not necessary for our argument here.
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Figure 1: E¤ects of the lot on the market price and on consumer surplus.
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of the black pentagon and the red triangle in Figure 1a. Figure 1c depicts the outcome
of buying the requirements from a one-shot competitive market, and the black triangle
is the resulting CS. Finally, Figure 1d displays the di¤erence between the two CSs: the
buyer has to pay for the additional cost due to the ine¢ cient organization and quantity
of production (the blue triangle) but he managed to lower the average price (the two
red trapezoids). As the red area is larger than the black one, setting the lot increases the
buyers prot.
In the remainder of the paper we establish the generality of this result, and also
characterize the optimal lot policy.
3 The base model
Consider n > 1 identical suppliers producing an innitely divisible homogeneous good/service
with a strictly increasing, strictly convex and thrice di¤erentiable cost function c (x).11
There is a single buyer, B, with a twice continuously di¤erentiable, quasi-linear vNM
utility function, V (x; $) = U(x) + $, with U 0(x) > 0, U 00(x) < 0 for x 2 [0; 1], with the
normalization U 0(1) = 0. The cost and utility functions are common knowledge. We
study the following two-stage procurement game: First, B announces m 2 f0; 1; :::; n 1g
contracts for (indivisible) lot sizes z1  :::  zm, where
mX
i=1
zi = Z  1. Next, these
contracts are sequentially auctioned, in decreasing order of size.12 As standard in multi-
sourcing arrangements, each supplier can win at most one block contract. Following the
lot auctions, each supplier decides whether to compete for the residual demand in the
aftermarket.13 We distinguish two cases of the aftermarket. If there is a single remaining
supplier, then we have a bilateral monopoly. In this case, the parties engage in Coasian
bargaining and share the residual surplus in proportion (; 1   ) between the supplier
11To ensure that second-order conditions for optimality are globally satised, we assume that c000(x)x+
c00(x) > 0 for x 2 [0; 1].
12Given complete information, the exact format of the auctions does not matter, even sequentiality we
only assume for simplicity.
13To start with, we assume that the buyer cannot commit not to satisfy his residual demand. We
analyze the consequences of strategic demand distortion in Section 6.
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and the buyer, respectively. When there are multiple remaining suppliers, they compete
in (unit) prices.14 We assume that they play the equilibrium that leads to the e¢ cient
outcome at the competitive (unit) price.
In constructing our model, we have striven for a balance between realism and parsi-
mony that best puts into relief our contribution. Still, some of our modelling assumptions
may benet from justication.
First, we carry out our analysis under complete information. On the one hand, this
obviously simplies and focuses the analysis. On the other hand, we can a¤ord to forgo the
presence of informational rents, unnecessary in our model to give prots to the suppliers.
Moreover, we are not conducting a mechanism design exercise here (where the exact nature
of asymmetric information is crucial, see, for example, Manelli and Vincent, 2006), rather,
we analyze the usefulness of some standard practices.
Second, we assume that suppliers are identical. This is just for simplicity. Our qualita-
tive results, especially that setting lots larger than the sellerscompetitive supplies leads
to increased buyer prot, do not depend on the symmetry assumption.
Third, we assume that conditional on the number of suppliers left  the residual
market is e¢ cient: we either have Coasian bargaining, or a competitive market. This
allows for a fair comparison. There is a host of reasons why faced with the multiplicity
of equilibria in the Bertrand game with convex costs the competitive market outcome
is a sensible assumption, and we discuss these in detail in Appendix B. In any case, at
the cost of complicating the algebra, our model could easily be adapted to (additional)
ine¢ ciencies arising in the residual market.
Fourth, we posit that the auction for the lots precedes the market/negotiation for
the residual demand. Yet again, our pursuit of simplicity is complemented by another
argument: in this case, realism. It is likely that at the time of auctioning the lots the nal
demand is not yet certain, so the residual demand is satised later. Explicitly modelling
the uncertainty and its resolution would unnecessarily complicate the analysis, taking us
away from the focus of this paper.
14Note that if the buyer decides not to set a lot his default option  then he directly goes to the
competitive market.
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Finally, we do not model explicitly the outside options of the suppliers. A realistic
way of modelling them would be to assume that each supplier has the option to sell some
amount of its production at a high price outside the market (think of guests showing up
at a hotel without reservation). This would simply shift the supply curves to the left by
the quantity sold o¤-market. As a result, our qualitative results would not be a¤ected.
4 Preliminaries
In a competitive equilibrium with g suppliers and Z units already committed to (by
other suppliers), where both the buyer and the suppliers behave as price takers, the total
production would be Qc(g;Z) = gqc(g;Z) that satises U 0(Z + Qc(g;Z)) = c0(qc(g;Z)).
When g = n and Z = 0, we drop the arguments: Qc = nqc with U 0(Qc) = c0(qc) is the
e¢ cient benchmark that we will keep referring back to.
We start by an important observation that simplies our search for the optimal block
sourcing policy. Though at rst it may sound counter-intuitive, the buyers optimal policy
does not have all suppliers participating in the aftermarket. He sets his lots in a way that
the lot winners are e¤ectively priced out of the aftermarket due to their high marginal
costs.
Lemma 1 The buyer must exclude lot winners from the aftermarket, in order to (po-
tentially) increase his prot. He can only achieve this by setting lots satisfying zi 
qc(n+ 1  i;
i 1X
j=1
zj), i = 1; :::;m.
The logic of this result is simple: if a lot winner participated (selling an additional q0
units) in the aftermarket which indeed must be a market as the lot winner is joining
at least one loser (selling q units) then, in equilibrium, marginal costs would equalize,
c0(zi+q0) = c0(q)) zi+q0 = q, leading to the same outcome as if the lot won had not been
o¤ered. In order for a lot winner not to want to participate, her marginal cost given the
commitment to produce the lot must exceed the price that would arise in the aftermarket
(if she participated), which equals the marginal cost of the competitive quantity. Given
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this result, we can safely assume that the buyer indeed sets m lots so that lot winners do
not participate in the aftermarket:
zi  qc(n+ 1  i;
i 1X
j=1
zj); i = 1; :::;m: (1)
Remark 1 The larger the inside option is, the larger the minimum size of a lot that
can make a di¤erence. This puts into perspective the result of Inderst (2008), that buyer
competition makes single-sourcing less likely: if there were additional buyers, then the
competitive quantity would be higher, so our buyer would have to increase his lot size. As
that would increase the ine¢ ciency, he would be pushed to set fewer lots than when he is
in a monopsony position. Basically, when the buyer has competition he has less control
over the supplier prots, so while setting lots has the same ine¢ ciency cost, its e¤ect on
decreasing supplier rents is lower.
Our next observation is that since all suppliers are identical in equilibrium it must
be the case that a seller that does not win any lot earns the same prot as any of the
winners (and the other losers). Let z = (z1; :::; zm). Denote the prots of a supplier that
does not get any of the m lots and therefore, by Lemma 1, competes with n  m   1
suppliers for the residual demand by  (z).
Lemma 2 Given any feasible z, the equilibrium prot of each supplier is equal to  (z).
Basically, the auction and the aftermarket serve as inside options for the suppliers,
enforcing indi¤erence in equilibrium. This result points to the important externalities
between the lot auction(s) and the residual market: the more competitive is one the more
competitive becomes the other. This interconnection is what the buyer exploits when
setting his lot policy. The lemma also implies that conditional on the lot sizes the
market/negotiation for the residual demand determines all supplier prots.
Next, note that to determine a losers prot, we only need to know the number and
aggregate size of the lots, individual lot sizes do not matter. As Lemma 1 implies that
we can ignore cases when some lot winner participates in the aftermarket, the latter has
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only the losers participating. Therefore, the residual demand will only depend on the
aggregate lot size, Z, and the aggregate (residual) supply will only depend on the number
of losing suppliers, n m. Consequently, we can write  (n m;Z) for  (z).
From Lemma 2, the price, bi, of lot zi leaves the winner of this lot with the same prots
as suppliers that serve the aftermarket, bi   c(zi) =  (n m;Z) so the equilibrium cost
to the buyer of procuring lot zi is
bi = c(zi) +  (n m;Z) : (2)
When there arem 2 f0; :::; n 2g lots, by denition, we have a competitive aftermarket
with a unit price of pc (n m;Z) = c0(qc (n m;Z)).15 Each loser has competitive prots
 (n m;Z) = qc0(q)   c(q) and the buyer pays (n  m)qp = (n  m)qc0(q). Consumer
surplus is
U(Z + (n m)q) 
mX
i=1
bi   (n m)qc0(q)
= U(Z + (n m)q) 
"
mX
i=1
c(zi) + (n m)c(q) + n (n m;Z)
#
; (3)
where we have written qc0(q) as c(q)+ (n m;Z). Note that the total procurement cost
can be written as the sum of production costs
P
c(zi) + (n   m)c(q) and the rents for
sellers in equilibrium n (n m;Z).
When there are n   1 lots, the single loser negotiates with the buyer and has prots
 (1;Z) =  [U(Z + q)  U(Z)  c(q)] and the buyer pays a total amount T =  (1;Z) +
c(q) for quantity q in the negotiation. Consumer surplus is
U(Z + q) 
n 1X
i=1
bi   T = U(Z + q) 
"
n 1X
i=1
c(zi) + c(q) + n (1;Z)
#
: (4)
Total procurement costs can be written again as the sum of production cost
P
c(zi) +
c(q) and the rents for sellers in equilibrium n (1;Z). In both cases (3) or (4), losers
prots  (n m;Z) depend only on the number of lots and on the total lot procurement
15To simplify notation, from here on we drop the arguments and the c superindex from the competitive
quantities and prices.
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quantity Z, not on the distribution of lots sizes. Therefore, by appealing to e¢ ciency, it
is immediate to obtain the following result:
Lemma 3 Optimally, all lots are of equal size, zi  z = Z=m.
With this observation (1) can be simplied: it is without loss of generality to facilitate
the exposition by only considering block sourcing policies such that no winner of a lot
will want to participate in the aftermarket: z  qc.
There are three variables that can a¤ect consumer surplus: z, m and q. The last of
these can be  indirectly  chosen via the announcement of a demand function at the
beginning of the game. As whether or not the buyer has the ability to commit to a
demand that is not his true demand is not a choice rather, it depends on institutional
constraints we consider both cases separately. We start with the situation where the
buyer cannot pretend that he has a lower demand than he actually has. Say, a Health
Board cannot credibly threaten not to hire nurses for one of its hospitals.
5 Results when the buyer cannot hide his demand
In the absence of commitment power, the buyer must report his true preferences and thus
the quantity produced by a loser, q, satises
U 0(mz + (n m)q) = c0(q); (5)
whether it is a negotiation (m = n   1) or a market (m < n   1) as both lead to the
e¢ cient outcome (conditional on the residual demand), by assumption.
Remark 2 It is useful to observe that setting m  n   2 lots of z = qc is equivalent to
setting no lots at all: U 0(mqc + (n m)q) = c0(q) is solved by q = qc.
Using Lemma 3, we can write (3) and (4) as
CS = U(mz + (n m)q)  [mc(z) + (n m)c(q) + n (n m;mz)] ; (6)
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with
 (n m;mz) = c0(q)q   c(q) when m < n  1, and
 (1; (n  1)z) =  [U((n  1)z + q)  U((n  1)z)  c(q)] .
Before turning to the selection of the optimal block sourcing policy and to the question
of when it is benecial for the buyer to bundle some of his requirements, let us characterize
what the implications of imposing lots larger than the competitive quantity (z > qc) are.
Proposition 1 When the buyer cannot misrepresent his demand, setting m 2 f1; :::; n 
1g lots of z > qc implies that losers produce less than the competitive quantity, q < qc, but
overall there is overproduction, Q = mz + (n m)q > Qc.
Overproduction is possible despite the e¢ cient aftermarket as what ex post is e¢ cient
ex ante need not be. By the fact that the lots are larger than the competitive quantities,
the division of requirements between the lots and the aftermarket is ine¢ cient. The
decrease in the second-stage quantities relative to the competitive ones does not fully
compensate for the inated lot size (c.f. Figure 1d, noting that U 0(Q) = p2, even though
the unit price paid for the lot is higher than p2. This can be seen on Figure 1b: the total
quantity is 2q + z, where U 0(2q + z) = c0(q)).
The key insight is that e¢ ciency implies that the marginal utility of the buyer de-
termines the aftermarket quantity sold by each loser via U 0(Q) = c0(q). As a result, Q
and q are negatively related. Thus, since, q has gone down relative to the competitive
benchmark, Q must have gone up.
Marginal cost pricing in the aftermarket implies that the lot winners, who produce
more, must be paid a higher (unit) price to compensate for their higher costs (otherwise,
every extra unit they would sell at a loss, contradicting that they make the same prot
as the losers in the lot auction).
Corollary 1 When the buyer leaves at least two suppliers for the aftermarket, the unit
price of a lot is higher than the unit price in the aftermarket.
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The optimal number of lots, in principle, could be any between 0 and n  1. However,
it is straightforward to show that the buyers prot is increasing in the number of lots, at
least up to n  2 of them. He will never want to leave more than two suppliers without a
lot (and thus to compete for the residual demand).
Lemma 4 Without commitment power, the buyer will never set fewer than n  2 lots.
The key argument behind this result is that the way the buyer can squeeze the sup-
pliers prot margin is by restricting the quantity available in the aftermarket. The
ine¢ ciency cost of raising the lot sizes to achieve the same increase in the aggregate lot
size is clearly decreasing in the number of lots. This is complemented by the fact that
the buyer makes higher prots on the lots as the lot suppliers make the same prot as
the losers but they produce more. The following example illustrates, in a crisp manner,
that reducing the number of suppliers in the aftermarket is always protable, while there
remain at least two of them.
Example 1 Suppose that in contradiction to Lemma 4 the buyer sets a lot policy of
(z; z; q; q; q): two lots of z and three suppliers in the aftermarket. Now consider changing
the policy by moving a supplier from the aftermarket to the lot auction maintaining her
quantity at q: (z; z; q; q0; q0). Observe that q0 = q, since U 0(2z + 3q) = c0(q) and U 0(2z +
q + 2q0) = c0(q0). In fact, by the same token, this alternative policy leads to the same
consumer surplus. But now the buyer can trivially improve by equalizing the size of her
lots, (z0; z0; z0; q; q). As the aftermarket outcome only depends on the aggregate lot size
and number, when 3z0 = 2z + q, the second period prots and quantities are una¤ected,
so the buyer can pocket all of the e¢ ciency gain.
We are now ready to provide a characterization of the optimal buyer strategy that
applies to any number of suppliers and for all cost and utility functions satisfying our
assumptions. By Lemma 4, it is evidently a two-horse race: the buyer either sets n  2 or
n 1 lots. That is, the buyer chooses between negotiating with a single supplier or leaving
two of them to compete in the aftermarket. Since both options are (constrained) e¢ cient,
the decisive factor must be the distribution of bargaining power. When the supplier is
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powerless ( = 0) andm = n 1 the buyer takes away all the surplus from the aftermarket,
while (all) the suppliers have zero prot for any aftermarket quantity of trade. As a result,
the buyer has no incentive to distort from e¢ ciency, so there is e¢ cient trade all lots,
as well as the aftermarket quantity traded are equal to qc and the buyer only pays for
the actual production cost.16 This is his rst best, which dominates setting n   2 lots
(what always leads to prots for the suppliers). As  increases, the consumer surplus with
m = n  1 monotonically decreases and we have the following simple characterization:
Proposition 2 For any n, strictly convex cost function c (:) and decreasing demand func-
tion U 0(:), there exists b 2 (0; 1], such that if  < b, then the optimal number of lots is
n  1 and if  > b, then the optimal number of lots is n  2.
Note that the proposition implies that, except for the case of two suppliers with
large17 bargaining power, the buyer will always be able to increase his utility by block
sourcing. By Proposition 1 the buyers increased prot is accompanied by a double
ine¢ ciency. Too much is produced and the production is distributed ine¢ ciently across
suppliers. As a result, the suppliers are worse o¤.
5.1 Illustration
In this subsection we explicitly calculate the optimal policy for a family of utility and
cost functions, what enables us to carry out insightful comparative statics exercises. As-
sume that the buyers utility function is U(Q) = (1 Q=2)Q, while the cost function is
c(q; r; n) = nr
2
q2. Note that with this cost function aggregate capacity is independent of
n: the competitive equilibrium features total production Qc(r) = 1
1+r
, consumer surplus
CSc(r) = 1
2(1+r)2
and total welfare W c(r) = 1
2(1+r)
.
With n   2 lots of size z, there are 2 rms in the aftermarket. Each one produces
q = 1
2+nr
(1   (n   2)z). The optimal size of the lots is the one that satises (17), which
16Note that while the quantities produced by each supplier are the competitive ones, the prices are
not, the buyer retains all the surplus.
17In the following subsection, we provide examples for the value of b as a function of the number of
suppliers and the characteristics of the demand and cost functions.
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in this quadratic example is
z(n; r) =
1
n
 n(1 + r) + 2
n(1 + r2) + (n+ 2)r
. (7)
Firms in the aftermarket produce q(n; r) = 1
n
 nr+2
n(1+r2)+(n+2)r
, while total production is
Q(n; r) =
n(1 + r)
n(1 + r2) + (n+ 2)r
. (8)
We see that rms in the aftermarket produce less than rms that win a lot, q(n; r) <
Q(n; r)=n < z(n; r), and total production is above the e¢ cient one, Q(n; r) > Qc(n; r), if
and only if n > 2 (n = 2 means no lots and therefore Q(2; r) = Qc(r)). In equilibrium,
consumer surplus is
CS(n; r) =
1
2
 n
n(1 + r2) + (n+ 2)r
: (9)
Consumer surplus is larger than in a competitive market, CSc(r), if and only if n > 2.
The relative increase in consumer surplus, CS(n;r)
CSc(r)
= n(1+r)
2
n(1+r2)+(n+2)r
, is increasing in n and
single-peaked in r, attaining its maximum at r = 1. At this value of r it is 4n
3n+2
; therefore
the gain in consumer surplus by setting n   2 lots is bounded by 1=3 of the original
amount.
With n  1 lots of size z0, there is one rm left to negotiate a price for producing the
e¢ cient residual quantity q0 = 1
1+nr
(1  (n 1)z0). The optimal size of lots is the one that
satises (17), which in this quadratic example is
z(n; r;) =
r + 
nr(1 + r) + (n  1); (10)
and the rm left to negotiate produces q(n; r;) = r
nr(1+r)+(n 1) , while total production
is
Q(n; r;) =
nr + (n  1)
nr(1 + r) + (n  1): (11)
We see that the rm that negotiates produces less than the rms that win a lot, q(n; r;) <
Q(n; r;)=n < z(n; r; ) and total production is again above the e¢ cient one, Q(n; r;) >
Qc(r) if and only if  > 0 ( = 0 means that the buyer receives all the surplus in the
negotiation and it makes sense to set e¢ cient lots, z0 = q0 = Qc(r)=n) and is increasing in
. This last observation has a straightforward explanation: as the buyer loses bargaining
power, he wishes to decrease the last (and therefore all) suppliers prot. As he cannot
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reduce the quantity negotiated over ex post, he uses the lot policy to achieve the same
goal. In equilibrium, consumer surplus is
CS(n; r;) =
1
2
 nr(1  ) + (n  1)
nr(1 + r) + (n  1) (12)
and it is decreasing in , as expected. At  = 0, the buyer reaps all the surplus created in
his relationship with the suppliers and also structures production e¢ ciently, leading to his
rst best: CS(n; r; 0) = 1
2(1+r)
= W c(r). The relative increase in consumer surplus for a
buyer with high bargaining power can be very large in an industry with large diseconomies
of scale (high values of r) as CS(n;r;0)
CSc(r)
= 1 + r.
Comparing (12) with (9), we obtain that CS(n; r) > CS(n; r; ) that is, the buyer
prefers to leave two suppliers without a lot if and only if  > b(n; r)  nr(nr+2)
(nr+1)(nr+2) n .
Note that b(n; r) 2 (0; 1) if and only if r > (n  2)=n. In other words, for a given number
of suppliers, a negotiation is the more likely the lower r is: a less elastic supply favors
negotiation. Only for very low values of r that is, mild diseconomies of scale will the
buyer always prefer to leave a single supplier without a lot. Finally, in the particular case
of n = 2, b(2; r) < 1 is always satised. That implies that there exist some values of 
(specically,  > 2+2r
3+2r
) for which the default option of the market (that is, n  2 = 0 lots)
dominates setting a lot.
Figure 2 below displays b(n; r) for di¤erent values of the parameter18 h = 1
1+r
in the
interval (0; 1) and for the number of sellers n between 2 and 5.
Figure 3 shows the relative increase in consumer surplus when the buyer follows the
optimal lot policy.
6 Results when the buyer has commitment power
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that the buyer cannot strategically manipulate
his (residual) demand. While in many public procurement situations this is the realistic
18We transform r, that can take any positive value, into h that is always between 0 and 1.
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Figure 2: Without commitment, regions  > b(n; r) for which an aftermarket (n 2 lots)
dominates negotiation (n  1 lots)
assumption, a buyer often has some margin to distort his demand, similarly to a standard
monopsony. In this section, we analyze the consequences of the ability to commit to a
(lower) requirement. Note that, as only its intersection with the aggregate supply func-
tion matters, given complete information, committing to a particular (residual) demand
function is equivalent to committing to a xed amount bought in the second stage. We
assume that the buyer commits to a total demand before the lot auction takes place.19
Commitment power in itself increases consumer surplus, so we need to set up a di¤erent
default option before considering the e¤ects of block sourcing. Now, the buyer can decrease
the price which is still given by the marginal cost of suppliers by buying less. He
19This is the strongest form of commitment. An alternative would be that the buyer only commits to
a (residual) demand after the lot auction.
19
Figure 3: Relative increase in consumer surplus when r = 3=2.
maximizes U(Q) Qc0(Q=n) in Q, resulting in the rst-order condition20
U 0(Qm) = c0(Qm=n) +
Qm
n
c00(Qm=n): (13)
It is the second term on the right-hand side that is new, relative to the case without
commitment. As, by the convexity of the cost function, it is positive it is straightforward
that: Qm < Qc. Just standard monopsony.
The result that the buyer will always want to set at least n   2 lots continues to
hold with commitment. However, this is not a direct corollary of the result without
commitment as now the buyer can distort his demand.
Lemma 5 With commitment power the buyer will never set fewer than n  2 lots either.
We can now give a characterization of the equilibria for each of the two remaining
cases.
20The second-order condition is satised by our assumption that c000(x)x+ c00(x) > 0.
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Proposition 3 Suppose the buyer has commitment power. Then,
(i) With n  1 lots, if  < 1=n then the buyer leaves the same quantity for negotiation 
and sets the same lots as without commitment (leading to overproduction); other-
wise, he chooses not to have an aftermarket, q = 0,21 and there is underproduction,
Q < Qc.
(ii) With n  2 lots, we always have underproduction.
When the buyer is strong in the negotiation, he does not wish to exercise his commit-
ment power, as the loss of e¢ ciency would mostly come out of his share of the surplus,
even taking into account the e¤ect on the lot winnersprots. Consequently, the optimal
lot sizes are the same as if he had no commitment power and, by Proposition 1, we have
overproduction. Otherwise, at any level of the bargaining surplus he has the incentive to
reduce it, and consequently, he commits not to negotiate at all. As he has reduced the
number of producers (from n to n   1) this necessarily leads to underproduction: when
there is no aftermarket, the lot winners make zero prot and thus the buyer buys the lots
at cost. This means that he internalizes the cost fully and chooses the e¢ cient quantity
(with n   1 suppliers), what due to the increasing marginal cost is clearly less than
the e¢ cient quantity with n suppliers.
When he leaves two suppliers for the aftermarket, in this market he has an incentive,
like a standard monopsonist, to decrease demand. However, in our case he is more in-
terested in decreasing the sellers surplus than in increasing his own. As this demand
reduction is a strategic substitute for setting large lots, he ends up consuming less than
in the competitive equilibrium.
By Proposition 3, Proposition 2 carries over to the commitment case (with a di¤erent
threshold, of course): consumer surplus with n 1 lots is the same as before for  2 [0; 1=n]
and, therefore it is strictly decreasing in  and it is constant thereafter, while with n 2
21Actually, there might exist an equivalent solution with a very high negotiated quantity that also
yields zero surplus. We consider this completely unrealistic and discard it. It would also disappear with
any transaction costs attached to bargaining.
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lots it is obviously constant in . The fact that, when the buyer has all the bargaining
power ( = 0), n  1 lots are clearly superior, completes the argument.
Proposition 4 There exists e 2 (0; 1=n] [ f1g, such that if   e then the optimal
procurement strategy is to set n 1 lots. If  > e, then the optimal strategy is to set n 2
lots. When e = 1=n, then for all  2 [1=n; 1] both solutions are equivalent.
Just as in the case without commitment, the threshold value e cannot be explicitly
calculated in general. In the next section we investigate its comparative statics for a
family of cost functions.
6.1 Illustration
Assume that the buyers utility function is U(Q) = (1 Q=2)Q, while the suppliers
cost function is c(q;n; k) = n
k
1+k
q1+k with k > 0. We have c0 = nkqk > 0, c00 =
knkqk 1 > 0. This cost function implies that for any quantity symmetrically distributed
among the suppliers total production costs do not vary with the number of suppliers:
nc(Q=n;n; k)  r
1+k
Q1+k. As a consequence, we can investigate the e¤ects of changing
industry structure (the number of suppliers) holding industry capacityconstant.
Form Proposition 4, we know that for su¢ ciently low value of , n 1 lots are preferred.
We also know by Proposition 3 that when  > 1=n, the buyer commits to q = 0 after
auctioning n   1 lots, leaving the suppliers with no surplus. Therefore,22 when  > 1=n
and n  1 lots are auctioned, total cost is equal to n  1 production costs and consumer
surplus is
U(Q)  (n  1)c

Q
n  1

=

1  Q
2

Q 

n
n  1
k
Q1+k
1 + k
: (14)
The optimal quantity procured, Q1, satises the rst-order condition 1 Q1 
 
n
n 1
k
Qk1 =
0.
22By Proposition 3 and Lemma 6 when  < 1=n the buyer has an additional bias in favor of n  1 lots.
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On the other hand, consumer surplus when quantity Q is procured through n 2 equal
sized lots is
U(Q)  (n  2)c

Q  2q
n  2

  2c (q)  n [c0 (q) q   c (q)]
= U(Q)  n
k
1 + k
"
(n  2)

Q  2q
n  2
1+k
+ (2 + nk)q1+k
#
;
where we write the quantity z procured through a lot as z = Q 2q
n 2 . Given Q, the quantity
q sold by sellers in the market is q = Q
2+(n 2)( 2+nk2 )
1=k ; the optimal size of a lot is z =
( 2+nk2 )
1=k
2+(n 2)( 2+nk2 )
1=kQ. Therefore, when n  2 lots are auctioned, consumer surplus is

1  Q
2

Q  2 + nk
2(1 + k)
 
n
2 + (n  2)  2+nk
2
1=k
!k
Q1+k (15)
and the optimal quantity procured, Q2, satises 1 Q2  2+nk2

n
2+(n 2)( 2+nk2 )
1=k
k
Qk2 = 0.
Comparing (14) with (15), it is easy to check that for any total quantity, Q, purchased,
the total cost to the buyer is higher with n   1 lots if and only if n < f(k)  22k 1
k
.
Therefore, when  > 1=n, consumer surplus with n  2 lots is higher than with n  1 lots
if and only if n < f(k).23 We see in particular that, when n = 2 and production costs
are quadratic, k = 1, the market (n   2 = 0) performs equal to the procurement of one
lot; similarly, setting one lot leads to the same procurement costs as two lots when n = 3
and production costs are cubic, k = 2. The following corollary to Proposition 4 is now
immediate.
Corollary 2 If n < f(k) then e 2 (0; 1=n), if n = f(k) then e = 1=n and for any   e
the buyer is indi¤erent between setting n   1 or n   2 lots. Finally, if n > f(k) thene = 1.
Figure 4 below displays f(k). When  > 1=n, to reduce procurement cost it is
advisable to set n  1 (n  2) lots when n > (<)f(k).
23To see this, pick the optimal quantity for the higher cost option. The lower cost one will provide a
higher surplus at that quantity, which is not even the best option.
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Figure 4: Regions for which n   1 or n   2 lots minimize total procurement costs when
 > 1=n.
To get a better idea about the gains from the optimal policy as well as about the e¤ects
of a change in market structure, Figures 5 and 6 show the consumer surplus achieved for
the cost function c(x; n) = n
3
4
q4 when the number of suppliers moves from n = 3 to n = 5,
and compares them to the one achieved in the textbook monopsony which is the same
as our competitive market with commitment. In Figure 5 we see the level of consumer
surplus that can be achieved in the presence of n = 3 suppliers. Total procurement costs
with 1 lot are lower than with 2 lots when  > 1=3, since we have n < f(k) = 14=3. For
 < 1=3, 1 lot is still preferred if  > e  0:273.
In Figure 6 we see the level of consumer surplus that can be achieved in the presence
of n = 5 suppliers. Total procurement costs with 3 lots are higher than with 4 lots when
 > 1=5, since we have n > f(k) = 14=3. Therefore, when n = 5 we have e = 1 and the
optimal procurement policy is always to set 4 lots (and additionally negotiate with the
remaining supplier if  < 1=5).
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Figure 5: Consumer surplus in the presence of n = 3 suppliers with cost functions c(q) =
27
4
q4.
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Figure 6: Consumer surplus in the presence of n = 5 suppliers with cost functions c(q) =
125
4
q4.
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With 0  m  n  2 lots of optimal size, consumer surplus is
U(Q)  TPC(Q;m) =

1  Q
2

Q  A(m)
1 + k
Q1+k; (16)
where we have dened A(m)  n m+nk
n m

n
n m+m(n m+nkn m )
1=k
k
and the optimal quantity
procured, Qn m, satises 1 Qn m   n m+nkn m

n
n m+m(n m+nkn m )
1=k
k
Qkn m = 0.
We know from Lemma 5 that for any strictly convex cost function TPC(Q;m) is de-
creasing in m. Thus, for the particular cost funtions we consider here, A(m) is decreasing
in m. We thus have marginal procurement costs TPCQ(Q;m) = A(m)Qk that satisfy
TPCQ(Q;n 2) < TPCQ(Q; 0). So it is immediate that, if the buyer sets n 2 lots, then
consumption is larger than the one chosen by a monopsonist that does not set lots, Qm.
On the other hand, when  > 1=n; if the buyer prefers n  1 to n  2 lots it is because
the marginal procurement cost,
 
n
n 1
k
Qk, are below TPCQ(Q;n 2); therefore we obtain
again that consumption is larger than Qm.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the optimal way for a buyer to group together part of his requirements
into block contracts. We have identied a critical block size, equalling the e¢ cient quan-
tity, that determines whether the block contract a¤ects the market outcome. With more
than two suppliers, block sourcing is always protable and the only question is whether
the buyer leaves one or two suppliers without a lot. At the same time except in the case
where he has commitment power but not too high bargaining power and there are many
suppliers the buyer tends not to divide all his requirements into lots and leaves some
for the aftermarket.
While we have framed our discussion around the decisions of a single buyer, our model
can also be interpreted as one where many independent buyers consider grouping together
to improve their bargaining position versus the suppliers. Given the absence of quantity
discounts, as we have increasing marginal costs, this does not sound an obvious strategy.24
24Group purchasing organizations (GPOs) have recently received some special attention, specially in
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However, if we interpret setting a block as the establishment of a purchasing group, our
results imply that the prices obtained for the block contracts are indeed lower than the
competitive price. Interestingly, the buyers not part of the block improve their prices
even more,25 so the formation of the group may be a complicated process. We leave the
analysis of that for further research.
what refers to the health care reform debate in the US. In particular, the analysis is concerned about
their e¤ects on the total health care costs and the competitive e¤ects of these groups (see, e.g. Blair and
Durrance, 2014 and Rooney, 2011). Gong et al. (2012) cite examples in Canada and Australia that see
signicantly lower prices vis-à-vis the U.S. for the same drugs.
25Recall Corollary 1.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. We start by showing that if, in equilibrium, the winner of the
smallest lot is interested in participating in the aftermarket then the buyers prots would
be the same as if the smallest lot was not o¤ered. The quantity traded in the second-
stage market by a loser is q0, where U 0
 
Z + (n m)q0 +
mX
i=1
[q0   zi]+
!
= c0(q0), as, of
course, q0 must be larger than zi, for the winner of lot i to participate in the aftermarket.
Without lot m, the quantity traded in the second-stage market by a loser would be q,
where U 0
 
Z   zm + (n m+ 1)q +
m 1X
i=1
[q   zi]+
!
= c0(q). It is immediate that q = q0
and therefore c0(q) = c0(q0) and, consequently, the two outcomes are the same. Therefore,
the only way the buyer can hope for a better outcome than the competitive one is by
setting the smallest lot larger than the competitive quantity for n m+1 suppliers: zm 
qc
 
n+ 1 m;
m 1X
j=1
zj
!
. By induction, he needs lot i larger than qc
 
n+ 1  i;
i 1X
j=1
zj
!
.
As this increase decreases the residual demand, the resulting aftermarket unit price will
be lower than the competitive one, c0
 
qc(n+ 1  i;
i 1X
j=1
zj)
!
, so the lot winners who
produce more than the competitive amount and therefore have a marginal cost above
c0
 
qc(n+ 1  i;
i 1X
j=1
zj)
!
are e¤ectively priced out of the aftermarket.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let the equilibrium prot of the winner of lot m k +1 be denoted
by (k)w .
Induction hypothesis (IH): If there are k lots left then (k)w =  (z) :
Step 1: The IH holds when k = 1. Since m < n there are n  m + 1  2 remaining
suppliers. It is immediate that in equilibrium neither (1)w >  (z) nor 
(1)
w <  (z). In
the rst case any losing bidder could do better by bidding slightly below the winners
bid (which must have been the (weakly) lowest), whereas in the second case the winner
could increase her prots by increasing her o¤er in order to lose. The latter argument,
presupposes that there is another valid bid for the lot in equilibrium. This must be the
case as otherwise the winner could increase her o¤er and still win.
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Step 2: If the IH holds for k then it is also true for k+ 1. By the IH, all the suppliers
who do not win lot m   k will earn  (z). Thus, the argument used in Step 1 can be
directly applied to show that (k+1)w =  (z).
Proof of Lemma 3. For any demand, given a total quantity Z obtained through m lots,
to maximize (3) or (4) individual lot sizes must be set to minimize total (lot) production
costs
X
c(zi). Given convexity and symmetry of the cost functions, it is immediate that
identical lots minimize them.
Proof of Proposition 1. By (5) z > qc directly implies q < qc. For the overproduction
result, note that we cannot have Q < Qc: If we write (5) as U 0(Q) = c0(q) we have
dq
dQ
= U
00(Q)
c00(q) < 0 (less production in the aftermarket if there is more total production since
this is related with lower market prices), then Q < Qc would imply q > qc, which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Corrollary 1. By Proposition 1, z > q. As both winning and losing suppliers
make the same prot of  = c0(q)q   c(q), we have that the di¤erence in unit prices is
c(z) + 
z
  c0(q) = c(z)  c(q) + c
0(q)(q   z)
z
=
Z z
q
c0(s)  c0(q)
z
ds > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let n > 2, as otherwise the Lemma holds by default. By (6) the
optimal size of a lot, z, satises (for a given number of lots, m  1)
dCS(q; z;m)
dz
= m [U 0((n m)q +mz)  c0(z)]  n0(q)@q
@z
= 0, (17)
where q is given by (5), satisfying @q
@z
=   mU"
(n m)U" c"(q) < 0. Note that z
 > qc for any
m  1, since by Remark 2, dCS(q;qc;m)
dz
=  n0(q)@q
@z
> 0. By Remark 2, (for any m > 0)
setting lots at qc is equivalent to setting none. Thus, since we have shown that optimally
the lot size is strictly larger than qc, the consumer surplus is also strictly larger than in
the competitive market (without lots). As a result, it is always strictly optimal to set at
least one lot.
To look for the optimal number of lots that leave at least two sellers in the market,
1  m  n   2, we di¤erentiate the consumer surplus with respect to m, momentarily
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disregarding that it is an integer and taking into account that dCS(q;z
;m)
dz
= 0:
dCS(q; z;m)
dm
= (z   q)U 0((n m)q +mz)  [c(z)  c(q)]  n0(q) @q
@m
;
we then use (17) to write
dCS(q; z;m)
dm
= (z   q)U 0((n m)q +mz)  [c(z)  c(q)] 
 m [U 0((n m)q +mz)  c0(z)] @q=@m
@q=@z
:
Note that, by (5), we can write @q=@m
@q=@z
= z
 q
m
. Therefore,
dCS(q; z;m)
dm
= (z   q)U 0((n m)q +mz) 
  [c(z)  c(q)] m [U 0((n m)q +mz)  c0(z)] z
   q
m
=   [c(z)  c(q)] + c0(z)(z   q) =
Z z
q
fc0(z)  c0(s)gds > 0.
That is  since z > q, by Proposition 1 buyer prots are strictly increasing in the
number of (optimally sized) lots, as long as the aftermarket is competitive.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us start with a lemma.
Lemma 6 The consumer surplus at the optimal lot size with n 1 lots is strictly decreasing
in the suppliersbargaining power: dCS

d
< 0.
Proof. The e¢ cient residual quantity, q (Z), solves U 0 (Z + q) = c0 (q) where Z =
(n  1) z.
CS = U(Z)  (n  1)

 [U (Z + q (Z))  U(Z)  c (q (Z))] + c

Z
n  1

+ (1  ) [U (Z + q (Z))  U(Z)  c (q (Z))] :
At the optimal size of the n   1 lots CSZ = 0, which can be solved for Z (; :::) :
Di¤erentiating with respect to  at the optimum we obtain
CS = CSZ
@Z
@
  n [U (Z + q (Z))  U(Z)  c (q (Z))] :
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As U 00 (r) < 0,
U (Z + q (Z)) U(Z) c (q (Z)) > U 0 (Z + q (Z))q (Z) c (q (Z)) = c0 (q (Z))q (Z) c (q (Z)) ;
which is (strictly) positive by the (strict) convexity of costs. Thus, as CSZ = 0, it follows
that CS < 0.
Putting Lemmas 4 and 6 together, and observing that when  = 0, there is no op-
portunity cost to choosing negotiation and therefore setting n   1 lots is superior, the
proposition is proven.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let n > 2, as otherwise the Lemma holds by default. Given any Q
he has chosen, the buyer will want to minimize costs. Note that if z < Q=n all suppliers
participate in the aftermarket and total procurement costs are the same as if no lot had
been set. If the buyer sets 1  m  n   2 (equal) lots of z  Q=n, followed by buying
q = Q mz
n m  z from each loser in the aftermarket, total procurement costs are
TPC(Q;m; z) = mc(z) + (n m)c (q) + n [c0 (q) q   c (q)] : (18)
First we show that, for any m > 0, the optimal lot size is interior z 2 (Q=n;Q=m)
that directly implies that it is always optimal to set at least one lot. Note that the total
procurement cost varies with the lot size according to
@TPC(Q;m; z)
@z
= m

c0(z)  c0(q)  n
n mc
00(q)q

: (19)
Substituting in z = q = Q=n, this is clearly negative. Similarly, at z = Q=m (and q = 0)
it is positive. Therefore, the optimal lot size satises @TPC(Q;m;z)
@z
= 0 or
c0 (q) +
n
n mc
00(q)q = c0(z): (20)
Treating the number of lots as a real number and di¤erentiating with respect to it
(evaluating at the optimal size, so that the terms multiplied by dz=dm disappear) we
have
dTPC(Q;m; z)
dm
= c(z)  c (q) 

c0 (q) +
n
n mc
00 (q) q

[z   q] : (21)
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Substituting (20) in, we obtain
dTPC(Q;m; z)
dm
= c(z)  c (q)  c0(z) [z   q] =  
Z z
q
[c0(z)  c0(s)] ds < 0; (22)
since c0(z)   c0(s) > 0 for s < z, by c00 > 0, and as q < z, the total procurement cost is
decreasing in the number of lots, for all 0 < m  n  2.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Consider that the buyer sets n   1 lots of size z, and
commits to buy an extra amount q. The second stage surplus created is (z; q) = U((n 
1)z+q) U((n 1)z) c(q). The suppliers obtain a share  of this. Of course (z; 0) = 0:
no prots for the loser if q = 0, and as a consequence the lot price is c(z). The buyer
chooses q (and z) to maximize
CS(z; q; ) = U((n  1)z + q)  [c(q) + (n  1)c(z) + n(z; q)]
= (1  n)(z; q) + U((n  1)z)  (n  1)c(z): (23)
When n > 1, creating surplus in the bargaining stage hurts the buyer, so his optimal
choice is to set q = 0. Also, there is underproduction: The buyers optimal size of the
lot z = Q
n 1 satises U
0(Q) = c0
 
Q
n 1

, whereas the e¢ cient level of production satises
U 0(Qc) = c0
 
Qc
n

, directly implying that Q < Qc.
If n < 1, then the buyer wants to maximize second stage surplus, leading to the e¢ -
cient second stage quantity, q. Therefore, the solution of the overall maximization problem
is the same as without commitment, given by (5) and (17), leading to overproduction.
(ii) The buyer chooses consumption Q to maximize
U(Q)  TPC(Q; n  2; z): (24)
where, substituting q for Q Z
2
and Q 2q
n 2 for z
TPC(Q; n  2; z) = (n  2)c

Q  2q
n  2

+ 2c(q) + n [c0(q)q   c(q)] (25)
The optimal level of consumption satises the rst-order condition @[U(Q) TPC(Q;n 2;z)]
@Q
=
0:
U 0(Q) 
h
c0(q) +
n
2
c00(q)q
i
= 0: (26)
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The consumption that maximizes welfare (or the competitive consumption without lots)
satises U 0(Qc) = c0(qc). On the other hand, since @TPC(Q;m;z)
@z
= 0, we know that the
optimal lot satises c0(q) + n
2
c00(q)q = c0(z), and therefore the buyer chooses a level of
consumption Q that satises U 0(Q) = c0(z) = c0(Q
n
+ s). Then @Q
@s
= c
00(z)
U 00(Q)  1
n
c00(z) < 0.
If we had z  Q=n it would mean s  0, implying that Q  Qc. However, we know
that z > qc > q; implying that (n   2)z + 2q = Q < nz, what is impossible. Therefore,
z > Q=n and so s > 0 and the buyer chooses Q < Qc. Finally, z > Q=n also implies that
q = Q (n 2)z
2
<
Q (n 2)Q
n
2
= Q
n
.
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Appendix B
Justication for the use of the competitive pricing equilibrium
There are two main classes of price competition models. We need not choose between
them in order to justify the competitive outcome.
In the classical Bertrand approach, rms bid unit prices. The buyer then accepts
the lowest price and satises his (residual) demand. If several suppliers make the same
bid, then the buyer shares his demand equally among them. This game is known (c.f.
Dastidar, 1995) to have multiple equilibria in the presence of increasing marginal cost.
The highest equilibrium price is the one at which a supplier makes the same prot as
she would by satisfying the entire demand on her own. Only for prices above this one
does it pay to undercut a competitor. The lowest equilibrium price is the one at which all
suppliers producing the same quantity just break even when they satisfy demand. For any
lower price it is ine¢ cient for trade to take place. It is easy to see that the competitive
price is within the Dastidar interval: on the one hand, the positive prots imply that it is
above the lower bound, on the other hand, at the competitive price the optimal quantity
for a supplier is the competitive one (selling at marginal cost) therefore it is clearly better
than satisfying the entire demand, so the competitive price must be below the upper
bound. Consequently, our assumption could be simply thought of as a judicious selection
maintains e¢ ciency, shares surplus26 from the set of equilibria. Nonetheless, we have
stronger arguments as well. We could modify the extensive form, so that the competitive
outcome is the unique equilibrium. Simply o¤ering a price quantity pair does not do away
with the multiplicity in a meaningful way: it leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium with
a broad support of equilibrium prices. However, as Dixon (1992) showed, if rms commit
not to a xed quantity, but to a maximum quantity that they are willing to supply at the
26In principle, the buyer could manipulate the equilibrium selection by a strategically chosen demand
sharing rule (for example, assigning all the production to a single, randomly chosen, supplier if their
asking prices were the same, unless they asked for a given price, where the production would be equally
shared). But this is neither realistic, nor does it take into account that the suppliers are likely to have
outside options, which the buyer would have to match.
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(unit) price they bid, then setting rationing rules and demand sharing rules judiciously
the unique equilibrium is the competitive one.
The alternative approach is where rms bid supply schedules (or menus). The buyer
aggregates these, and determines the outcome by crossing it with his demand. This game
is also known to have multiple equilibria. Bernheim and Whinston (1986), develop an
equilibrium renement concept Truthful Equilibrium that basically requires that the
relative di¤erences between di¤erent points of the menu reect the truth. Simply put, the
bids are thought of as two-part tari¤s and only the xed part can be manipulated strate-
gically. Again, only the e¢ cient outcome can be supported in a Truthful Equilibrium.
In a model that is in between the above two classes, Burguet and Sákovics (2017)
assume that rms are allowed to make separate o¤ers for the supply of every innitesimal
unit. From the point of view of each such unit, they simply receive (unit) price o¤ers, as
in Bertrand, but from the point of view of the suppliers, they name supply schedules, not
in terms of quantities but in terms of specic demand units. In the unique equilibrium, all
suppliers o¤er the competitive price to supply all the units, with no need to exogenously
specify rationing or demand sharing rules.
Finally, note that if in a specic institutional setting it were the case that the market
outcome is di¤erent from the competitive one assumed here, there are two possibilities. If
the equilibrium gave lower prots to the buyer, he would be even more in favor of setting
lots. If it gave higher prots, this would change two trade-o¤s: it would bias the buyer
towards n  1 lots as opposed to n  2, and it would make the overall likelihood of setting
a lot decrease. However, the qualitative results of our analysis would remain unaltered.
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